Discretion and Destruction: Promotions, Performance, and Patronage in the Royal Navy
Revision requested, Review of Economics and Statistics
Abstract
How effective is discretion for selecting leaders? We collect new data on the performance of more than 5,800 naval officers serving in the 18th century Royal Navy. Officers fast-tracked for promotion at the discretion of the Admiralty performed markedly better than those “passed over” – the Navy picked future winners. Selection was particularly effective for officers connected to the Admiralty through family ties. Instead of favoritism, we find that family ties and discretion allowed the effective use of private information. Keeping out the “wrong” connected officers while fast-tracking the high-performing ones was a key driver of superior selection.
Hans-Joachim Voth, Guo Xu (2022). “Discretion and Destruction: Promotions, Performance, and Patronage in the Royal Navy.” Revision requested, Review of Economics and Statistics.