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Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II

Philipp Ager, Leonardo Bursztyn, Lukas Leucht, Hans-Joachim Voth

Review of Economic Studies 89(5), pp. 2257-2292 (2022)

Published version VoxEU NBER Digest Data

Abstract

Using newly-collected data on death rates and aerial victories of more than 5,000 German fighter pilots during World War II, we examine the effects of public recognition on performance and risk-taking. When a particular pilot is honored publicly, both the victory rate and the death rate of his former peers increase.

Keywords
status competition, incentives, risk-taking, fighter pilots, World War II
DOI
10.1093/restud/rdab085
Canonical
https://www.jvoth.com/papers/killer-incentives.html

Philipp Ager, Leonardo Bursztyn, Lukas Leucht, Hans-Joachim Voth (2022). “Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II.” Review of Economic Studies.