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Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations

Leonardo Bursztyn, Ewan Rawcliffe, Hans-Joachim Voth

NBER Working Paper No. w34707

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Abstract

We study the ability of a firm to elicit repeated effort from workers by creating a "rat race" of hierarchical status-based incentives. We examine performance using data on over 5,000 German air force pilots during World War II. Pilots' effort is hard to monitor; motivation is key to success. Fighter pilot performance increases markedly as they approach eligibility for a medal before falling off upon receipt of the award.

Keywords
status incentives, organizations, rat race, German air force, World War II
JEL
Not specified
Canonical
https://www.jvoth.com/papers/never-enough.html

Leonardo Bursztyn, Ewan Rawcliffe, Hans-Joachim Voth (2026-01). “Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations.” NBER Working Paper No. w34707.